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power over the bank which is undesirable. 18 It is believed that the
courts are increasingly accepting these reasons as outweighing the
rather vague notion of "superior public rights" under which such
pledges to the public have been sustained, and that there is even less
reason for sustaining the pledges to secure private depositors. Expressions of doubt, and often of open disapproval, are coming from
the courts, as well as from commentators, as to the validity of allowing assets to be pledged whether to secure a public depositor or a
private depositor.' 9
The- banks themselves are becoming increasingly interested. At
the recent meeting of the executive council of the American Bankers'
Association the following was placed in the program for banking reform: "Deposits of public funds in banks should have the same
status as private deposits, and should not be accorded special and
additional security."' 20 It is submitted that such a plan is desirable
from the standpoint of sound banking, and would benefit the banks,
the depositors, and the public.
HERMAN S. MERRELL.

Bankruptcy-Compositions-A Suggestion fox Federal
Legislation.
In these days of economic stress it has become highly desirable
to find some method, less disastrous to the debtor than bankruptcy,
of relieving the insolvent debtor of his excessive debts. On first
appearance it would seem that the common law composition with
creditors might go a long way toward meeting this demand.
A common law composition with creditors is an agreement between an insolvent debtor and two or more of his creditors,' whereby
Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Citizens Tr. and G. Co., upra note 6.
'Commercial

The courts seldom mention this reason. However, it is believed to be a
material one, since a large depositor, heavily secured, would be in a position
largely to dictate to the bank. On the other hand, large corporations doing
business in numerous localities may refuse to patronize the smaller local
banks unless given security. The best remedy for this situation, under present banking laws, seems to be to permit surety bonds without a pledge, which
only decrease the amount of the bank's profits instead of actually taking away
general assets upon which all depositors have a right to rely equally. See
Cobp. Ass'n v. First State Bank, 168 Minn. 28, 209 N. W. 631 (1926).
"See Balt. & 0. Ry. v. Smith, supra note 14, at 867; Schumacker v. Eastern Bk. & Tr. Co., supra note 3 at 927. Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv.
608; (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 916; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1076; (1932) 10
NEB. L. BULL. 327; (1928) 2 DAK. L. REv. 68.
THE TARHmL BANKER, May, 1933, at 30; TIME, April 24, 1933, at 47.
1Schroeder v. Pissis, 128 Cal. 209, 60 Pac. 758 (1900) ("It is not necessary
that all the creditors of a debtor should sign a composition agreement in order
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the creditors agree to discharge the whole of their respective claims
upon payment of a dividend less than the full amount of the claim. 2
The consideration for the promise to accept a lesser sum in discharge of the larger sum lies in the reciprocal promises of the other
assenting creditors.3 The original claim is not discharged until the
agreement to pay the lesser sum is satisfied, although the right of
action thereon is temporarily suspended. If notes given as a part
of the dividend are not paid on maturity, the accepting creditor is
remitted to his original claim. 4 The utmost good faith is required
of the debtor and if he is guilty of any fraud the composition falls
and the assenting creditors are remitted to their original claims.5
The fraud which appears most often is that of giving a secret
preference to one or more of the assenting creditors. Of course,
if the non-preferred creditors know of the preference when they
enter the agreement, the preference is valid and the non-preferred
creditors cannot avoid the agreement. 6 Likewise, if a non-preferred
creditor accepts a payment under the agreement, after he has learned
of the preference, he is held to have waived his right to rescind. 7
Where the preference was secret it is the almost universal rule s
to make it valid and binding. It is sufficient if two or more creditors sign.");
Crawford v. Krueger, 201 Pa. 348; 50 Atl. 931 (1902).
'For other definitions of a composition with creditors, see In re Nachman
Co., 6 F. (2d) 427, 439 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Seaweard v. DeArmond, 101
Ore. 30, 34, 198 Pac. 916 (1921).
,"First Nat. Bank v. Ware, 95 Me. 388, 50 Atl. 24 (1901); Cohen v. P. E.
Harding Const. Co. 41 R. I. 242, 103 Atl. 703 (1918).
'Clarke v. White, 12 Pet. 178, 9 L. ed. 1046 (U. S. 1838); Farmers' Bank
of Dardanelle v. Sellers, 167 Ark. 152, 267 S. W. 591 (1925). A few cases
have refused to permit the creditor to reassert his original claim even though
the note given him as a part of his dividend has iot been paid on maturity.
This ruling, in each case, was based on the ground that the note had been taken
as payment, thereby intimating that had the note been accepted merely as a
promise to pay an installment under the composition agreement, the general
rule would have been followed. Bartlett v. Woodworth-Mason Co., 69 N. H.
316, 41 Atl. 264 (1898) ; Swartz v. Brown, 135 App. Div. 913, 119 N. Y. Supp.
1024 (1909).
Storms v.Horton,77 Conn. 334, 59 At. 421 (1905) ; Ball v.McGeoh, 81
Wis. 160, 51 N. W. 443 (1892).
Dillon v. Ennis, 205 S. W. 191 (Mo.1918); Continental Nat. Bank of
Chicago v. McGeoch, 92 Wis. 286 (1896).
'Farmers' Bank of Dardanelle v. Sellers, supra note 4.
' A careful search disclosed three cases holding that the non-preferred
creditors remain bound by the composition even though there was a secret
preference, but at least two of these have been overruled. Bartlett v. Blaine,
83 Ill. 25, 25 Am. Rep. 346 (1876); Page v. Carter, 16 N. H. 524, 41 Am.
Dec. 726 (1844) ; Babcock v. Dill 43 Barb. 577 (N. Y. 1865) ; in addition, a
dictum in a leading case states that so long as the preference agreement remains executory the non-preferred creditors remain bound. Hanover Nat.
Bank Of City of N. Y. v. Blake, 142 N. Y. 404, 37 N. E. 519, 27 L. R. A. 33,
40 Am. St. Rep. 607 (1894).
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that the non-preferred creditors are remitted to their original claims0
and may credit any amount received under the composition as a part
payment and sue for the balance.' 0 This rule is open to the objection that it permits the first non-preferred creditor to learn of
the fraud to come in and deplete the assets in the bands of the debtor
to the detriment of his fellow non-preferred creditors. This objection
appears sound in those cases in which all of the creditors are bound
by the agreement, but in those cases in which there are creditors
who never entered the agreement, the objection loses force in that
it does not appear that the non-preferred creditors will suffer any
more acutely from the fact that this fellow non-preferred creditor
gets his full claim than from the fact that the non-assenting creditors
get their full claims. The last argument in turn loses force when
it is noted that creditors of an insolvent debtor will very rarely enter
into a composition unless all, or at least a specified group representing substantially all of the creditors become parties. In any
case it would seem a good rule, as held in a few cases," that in
any action by a non-preferred creditor to rescind the composition
agreement, all the non-preferred creditors must be joined.
As to the preference itself, it is void; if executory it cannot be
enforced, 12 and if executed it can be recovered by the debtor.18
Thus the debtor, who was a party to the fraud practiced on the nonpreferred creditors, along with the preferred creditor, is allowed to
profit by his own wrongful act in that, in most cases, if the preference were not promised, the preferred creditor would not have
joined the composition and the debtor would have -been liable for
his full claim. Indeed, as between the debtor and preferred creditor,
the equities seem to be with the creditor who was entitled to his full
'Kullman v. Greenbaum, 92 Cal. 403, 28 Pac. 674 (1891); Powers Dry
Goods Co. v. Harlin, 68 Minn. 193, 71 N. W. 16 (1897).
"In T'e Chaplin, 115 Fed. 162 (E. D. Mass. 1902); Burgess v. Simpson
Grocery Co., 128 Ga. 423, 57 S. E. 717 (1907).
' Cheveront v. Textor, 53 Md. 296 (1879) ; Evans, Fite, Porter and Co. v.
Bell, 83 Tenn. 569 (1885).
" Batchelder & Lincoln Co. v. Whitmore, 122 Fed. 335 (C. C. A. 1st, 1903);
Brown v. Nealley, 161 Mass. 1, 36 N. E. 464 (1894).
'Brown v. Everett-Ridley-Ragan Co., 111 Ga. 404, 36 S. E. 813 (1900).

An exception to this rule is found in New York. The New York cases
unanimously hold the preference void and refuse to enforce it when executory.
Klaw v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 239 N. Y. 592, 147 N. E. 209 (1924);
Burk v. Wright, 226 App. Div. 274, 235 N. Y. Supp. 105 (1929), but where

the preference has been executed, the debtor is not allowed to recover the sum
paid as a preference on the ground that the parties being in pari delicto the
courts will leave them as it finds them. Solinger v. Earle, 82 N. Y. 393 (1880);
Mehr v. Starr, 138 N. Y. Supp. 317- (1912).
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claim and gave it up for the promised dividend and preference, which
in most cases added together is somewhat less than the full claim.
The only favorable side of the rule reached seems to be that the
non-preferred creditors can attack these assets if in the hands of
the debtor, and this is in turn subject to the criticism above set forth.
In respect to the dividend due to the preferred creditor under
the composition agreement, the overwhelming majority of courts
holds that, while the non-preferred creditors can assert their original
claims after the fraud is discovered, the preferred creditor is bound
by the agreement, and his recovery is limited to the dividend therein
14
provided, which he is permitted to retain.
The fact that on discovery of the preference the non-preferred
creditors may race for the assets lends instability to the composition and impairs its usefulness as an insolvency device. It Would
seem a sound rule, and a deterrent to secret preferences, to hold the
debtor bound to pay both the preference and the preferred creditor's
dividend, the payment, however, to be made, not to the preferred
creditor, but to the non-preferred creditors as a bonus above the
specified dividends. Of course, if this rule were applied, it follows
that the non-preferred creditors should be deprived of their right
to rescind the composition agreement. This would make it impossible for the first non-preferred creditor to learn of the fraud to
get an advantage in the race for the debtor's remaining assets, and
would seem to reach a generally desirable result.
Assuming such results to be established, there remains but one
obstacle preventing the composition from becoming an effective device for relieving harassed debtors, namely, inability to bind the nonassenting parties by compulsion. This obstacle might easily be removed by a statutory measure analogous to that provided for in
bankruptcy compositions. 15
A composition, if its legal handicaps are removed as above suggested, has at least three distinct advantages- over bankruptcy proceedings:
(1) The composition permits the debtor to retain control of his
assets, while in the bankruptcy proceedings the assets are turned
over to a referee to administer.
1Bank of Commerce v. -oeber, 88 Mo. 37, 57 Am. Rep. 359 (1885);
Gross, Kelly & Co. v. Bibo, 19 N. M. 495, 145 Pac. 480 (1914). One case was
found which permitted the preferred creditor, on being deprived of the preference, to sue on his original claim. Stewart v. Blum, 28 Pa. 225 (1857).
"30 STAT. 549 (1898) ; 36 STAT. 839 (1925), 11 U. S. C. A. §30 (1926).
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(2) After a discharge through a composition the debtor usually
is able to continue right on in his old established business, whereas
bankruptcy proceedings commonly destroy his business and force
him to start all over.
(3) A composition of this nature can be effected within a fewdays with little or no cost of administration, while the administra-.
tion of a bankrupt's estate generally takes a relatively long period
and often is so expensive that in the case of small estates there is.
nothing at all left for distribution to the creditors. 16
The National Bankruptcy Act as it stood before the Amendmentof March 3, 1933, provided that the bankrupt might offer either before or after adjudication, terms of composition to his creditors.
after, but not before, he has been examined in open court, or at a
meeting of his creditors, and has filed in court the schedule of his
property and list of his creditors required to be filed by bankrupts. 1T
The inability to bind the non-assenting creditors by compulsion found
in the common law composition is eliminated under the bankruptcy
composition by a provision that the composition may be confirmed,
thus binding all the creditors, whenever it has been accepted in
writing by the majority of the creditors representing a majority in
amount of such claims.' s
As regards the method of dealing with the problem of hidden
assets and secret preferences, it is doubtful if that provided for in
the bankruptcy composition is any more satisfactory than the present method of the common law composition. The Bankruptcy Act
provides merely that the judge may set aside the composition upon
the application of the parties in interest filed at any time within
six months after the composition has been confirmed if it shall appear that fraud was practiced in procuring the composition. 10 The
estate is then automatically administered in bankruptcy, a result which
maintains equality but is no better than can be reached under a.
common law composition by anyone of the non-preferred creditors
starting bankruptcy proceedings after learning of the fraud. It
further appears that this provision under the bankruptcy composiThe high cost of administering small estates in bankruptcy, as well as

the length of time necessary, is clearly shown in the charts prepared and used
by Mr. Billig in his article, Extra Judicial Administration of Intokvent
Estates: A Study of Recent Cases (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 293.

'Supra note 15.
'3 Supra note 15.
1130 STAT. 550 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §31 (1926).
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tion is weak in that it limits the right to attack the composition to
six months.
The composition in bankruptcy undoubtedly overcomes some
of the weaknesses manifested in the common law composition as it
now stands, but is far from a desirable method of meeting the
present day need. It is too formal, it has attached to it the stigma
of bankruptcy, and it does not satisfactorily deal with the problems of hidden assets and secret preferences, for which reasons compositions in bankruptcy have been relatively seldom resorted to.20
Section 73 of the Bankruptcy Act enacted by Amendment March
3, 1933,21 provides for compositions by debtors. This amendment
was enacted for the express purpose of aiding debtors to avoid
bankruptcy. It follows generally the terms of the earlier provision
for compositions in bankruptcy, is open to the same criticism, and
seems to offer no advantage not avaliable under the earlier pro22
vision.
Due to the prevalent dissatisfaction with bankruptcy proceedings, some years ago the National Credit Men's Association set up a
system of liquidating insolvent estates known as "friendly adjustment," which seems to be working with some success. 23 As a legal
device it amounts to a common law composition with the creditors
accepting their pro rata share of the assets in full discharge of their
claims. Of course, if any creditor or the debtor does not assent,
the estate will have to go through bankruptcy, but the Association,
so far, seems to have had marked success in getting all the parties
to assent.
The method of liquidation is analogous to that of bankruptcy
in that the assets are turned over to a third party to administer, in
this case a liquidating agent of the Association. The outstanding
advantages claimed for the "friendly adjustment" are that it car-

'See, Report By the Attorney General (Prepared By The Solicitor General)
To The President On The Bankruptcy Act And Its Administration In the
Courts Of The United States, Dated December 5, 1931, at page 10. ("Unfortunately the composition machinery is so cumbersome and so easily abused
by minority creditors that it is quite unattractive to honest debtors, as evidenced
by the fact that scarcely one per cent of the cases in bankruptcy terminate in
compositions.")
I11 U. S. C. A. Supp. §202 (1933).
'Supra note 15.

'For a more thorough study of "friendly adjustmeits," see Billig, What
Price Bankruptcy: A Plea For "Friendly Adjustment" (1929) 14 CORN. L.
Q. 413, and Billig, .supra note 16. For an adverse criticism of "friendly ad-

justments," see Gamer, On Comparing "Friendly Adjustment" and Bankruptcy

(1931)

16 CoRN. L. Q. 35.
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ries out the liquidation much more rapidly than is usual in bankruptcy, and that it pays larger dividend to the creditors. The rapidity of administration is accounted for by the fact that the Association maintains permanent liquidating forces which keep in close
contact with prospective purchasers of an insolvent's stock, while
the higher dividend is due to the lower cost of administration which
in every case is a flat ten per cent.
It has been objected that there is too great a chance for fraud
in this type of liquidation, but it would seem that the local agency
of the Association is in at least as good position as the court to ascertain the true state of the debtor's affairs. The real objections to
"friendly adjustments," in respect to our present need, seem to be
that under this plan ten per cent of the assets, which might well be
saved to the debtors, is paid to some outside party, and that, as is
true of a bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor is commonly put out of
business.
From the purely practical standpoint, it seems that in many
cases the parties themselves could effectuate a composition which,
by saving the costs of a bankruptcy proceeding or of a friendly adjustment, would reserve to the debtor sufficient assets to enable
him to continue on in his business and at the same time pay to the
creditors larger dividends than would either a bankruptcy or a
"friendly adjustment."
It would seem that a Federal statute reaching such a desirable
result and still containing sufficient checks against fraud might well
be worked out along the following lines:
(1) An insolvent debtor may at any time send to each of his
creditors a schedule of his assets and a list of his creditors, together
with notice of a creditor's meeting to be held not less than ten days,
and not more than twenty days, hence, for the purpose of working
out, if possible, the terms of a composition.
(2) If, at the meeting of the creditors, terms of composition
are arranged which are satisfactory to the debtor and to a majority
of the creditors representing a majority in amount of the claims,
who signify their assent by signing an agreement embodying the
terms arranged, all of the creditors shall be automatically bound.
There shall be reserved to any non-assenting creditor the right to
apply within ten days to a court of equity of the United States sitting in chambers to set aside the agreement for good cause shown.
(3) If no non-assenting creditor applies to have the agreement
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set aside within the ten day period, or, if on such application a decision favoring the validity of the agreement is handed down, the
agreement shall be -binding as of the date assented to as required,
and the rights of the parties shall thereafter be limited to the terms
of the agreement and the terms of this act.
(4) If the parties cannot reach an agreement as to the terms
of the composition, or if on application of a non-assenting creditor,
the agreement is set aside, the estate shall on the petition of any interested party, be automatically declared bankrupt.
(5) A copy of the composition agreement, containing the signatures of the assenting creditors and of the debtor, together with a
verified list of all the debtor's creditors and a verified schedule of
his assets shall be filed by the debtor with the U. S. district court,
for purposes of record.
(6) If the debtor fails to make any payment as provided for in
the agreement, any creditor may cause the estate to be administered
in bankruptcy, but the claims to be filed by the creditors who were
bound by the composition agreement shall be those provided for in
the composition and not the original claims. If, however, there
is a surplus remaining after all claims, both those provided for in
the composition and those subsequently acquired against the debtor,
have been paid in full, the surplus shall be paid pro ratato the creditors bound by the composition until their original claims are paid
in full.
(7) If at any time within five years after the composition became binding, assets which were fraudulently hidden at the time of
the composition, including any fraudulent conveyance made within
three years prior thereto, are discovered, on the application of any
interested party such assets shall be recovered and paid pro rata to
the creditors bound by the composition as a bonus above the dividend
agreed upon in the composition, even though the effect of such payment is to pay such creditors more than their original claims with
interest. Further, the debtor shall be subject to a criminal action.
(8) If, at any time within five years after the composition became binding, a secret preference to one of the creditors is diserence and the dividend to the preferred creditor shall be recovered
and paid pro rata to the other creditors bound under the composition, as a bonus above the dividend agreed upon in the composition
even though the effect of such payment is to pay such creditors more
than their original claims with interest. Further, both the debtor
and the preferred creditor shall be subject to criminal actions.
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It is submitted that an act based on the above suggestions would
go a long way toward meeting the present need for relieving hard
pressed debtors without destroying their businesses and without
working undue hardships on their creditors; and that such an act
might well be enacted by Congress as a system of relief alternate to
bankruptcy.
IRVIN

E. E"B.

Bills and Notes-Interpretation of "All Prior EndoYrsements
Guaranteed."
A draft was endorsed without authority by an attorney of the
payee and deposited for collection in a bank which forwarded it with
"all prior endorsements guaranteed" to the drawee who on the back
of the draft had reserved the right to determine the authority of
an attorney endorsing it. Held: Under these particular facts, the
collecting bank by its endorsement guaranteed to the drawee only the
genuineness of the prior endorsement and not the authority of the
endorser.'
Incited by the decision in two cases in which the drawee bank
could not recover back the money paid on a forgery, where the collecting bank had used a restrictive endorsement, the New York
Clearing House in 1896 adopted a rule requiring its members to
send no paper through the exchange which was restrictively endorsed, unless all prior endorsements were guaranteed. 2 Their
lead has since been followed by practically every clearing house in
the country.
Adequate protection is afforded to an endorsee who is a holder
in due course both in the case of forgeries and unauthorized prior
IHolloway

v. Barbee et al., 203 N. C. 713, 166 S. E. 895 (1932).

Inquiry

has revealed that this case is regarded by some as holding that "all prior endorsements guaranteed," guarantees to the drawee only the genuineness of
prior endorsements and not the authority of the endorser. This is an erroneous
view since the court decides no more than that such endorsement guarantees
only the genuineness of prior endorsements where the drawee has assumed
the risk of the authority.
The bank is designated as a drawee in this comment, since under §87 of the
N. I. L., "Where an instrument is made payable at a bank, it is equivalent
to an order to the bank to pay the same for the account of the principal
debtor thereon."
' First National Bank of Belmont v. First National Bank of Barnesville,
58 Ohio St. 207, 50 N. E. 723 (1898). Many of the clearing houses no longer
use the form "all prior endorsements guaranteed," but the members contract
to assume such responsibility. Some of the forms in use are: "endorsements
guaranteed," "previous endorsements guaranteed," "absence of endorsements
guaranteed," "absent endorsement hereby supplied and guaranteed."

